How to design a pro-poor payments for environmental services (PES) mechanism in the forest frontier? Lessons from action research in Madagascar by Toillier, Aurélie & Serpantié, Georges
1 
 
How to design a pro-poor payments for environmental services (PES) mechanism 
in the forest frontier? Lessons from action-research in Madagascar 
A. Toillier* and G. Serpantié** 
*CIRAD, UMR Innovation 
**IRD, UMR GRED 
Keywords: PES, watershed, pro-poor, co-design, local knowledge, farm-level, smallholders, slash-and-
burn agriculture, forest conservation, Madagascar.   
 
Abstract 
PES is considered new incentive tools for managing both the environment and rural development in 
developing countries. However, designing mechanisms tailored to smallholder characteristics and rural 
development requirements remains a challenge, particularly in tropical countries where the forest sector is 
characterized by long-standing patterns of inequality and poverty. In order to switch from theoretical 
principles to a really innovative management tool addressing local issues, we argue that it is necessary to 
include as from the beginning the characteristics of agricultural dynamics, and to involve local 
stakeholders in co-designing the ES and in solving problems encountered in their delivery. Through an 
action-research framework, we explored the characteristics of a “pro-poor” watershed-based PES 
mechanism associated with a hydropower project. The study site is located in the agricultural frontier of a 
rainforest in eastern Madagascar. We built a local and inclusive knowledge system based on (1) local and 
scientific knowledge on the relationships between land use and water services, (2) stakeholder 
perceptions on the electrification project, and (3) the heterogeneity of livelihoods of targeted households. 
We were then able to clarify what the environmental service and governance scheme could be. The main 
results show the necessity of going beyond economic and hydrologic rationales that usually underlie 
watershed-based PES development. In conclusion, we point out the main elements that underlined the 
design of a pro-poor PES scheme able to accompany or promote the changes that are advisable for 
agriculture in the forest frontier. 
 
1. Introduction 
The most widely used definition of payments for environmental/ecosystem/ecological services (ES) is that 
of Wunder (2005): Payments for Environmental Services are voluntary transactions where a well-defined 
environmental service is bought by an environmental service buyer from an environmental service 
provider if and only if the environmental service provider secures environmental service provision. PES 
were designed to translate external, non-market values of the environment into real financial incentives for 
local actors to provide ES (Engel et al., 2008). They are based on the beneficiary-pays – rather than the 
polluter-pays – principle and, as such, are attractive in settings where ES providers are poor. As a 
consequence, in developing countries there has been much enthusiasm over this new tool, perceived as 
an alternative to indirect approaches for natural-resource management such as ICDPs. PES are 
commonly promoted as “win-win” solutions for conservation and development, although there are few 
examples of successful schemes. Many authors argue that is necessary to pay more attention to 
addressing the constraints to implementation and to the design process needed to reach equity, efficiency 
and efficacy in the context of poor rural communities and high pressure on natural resources (Pagiola, 
2007; Leimona and Lee, 2008; Petheram and Campbell, 2010).  
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In this research, we explore perspectives of poor people living in the forest frontier, where introduction of 
watershed-based PES is being considered. In order to switch from theoretical principles to a really 
innovative management tool addressing local issues, we argue that it is necessary to co-define the PES, 
i.e., to anticipate collectively the problems that may be encountered in ES delivery and co-develop 
solutions with local stakeholders. The study site is located in a rainforest in eastern Madagascar, where a 
hydropower project is coming up. An action-research program was undertaken to explore the feasibility of 
a pro-poor watershed-based PES mechanism. This paper present some results from this program. First, 
we review questions and challenges in designing pro-poor watershed PES mechanisms. Then we present 
the social, environmental and economical contexts of the Tolongoina hydropower project. The main 
objectives and constraints to implementing a PES contract are then highlighted. In the third part, we 
explain the methodology we constructed based on a participatory framework. The results concern the 
main requirements that appeared important in designing a pro-poor watershed-based PES mechanism. In 
conclusion, we discuss the potential role for the PES tool in accompanying or promoting the changes that 
are advisable for agriculture in the forest frontier. 
2. Designing a pro-poor PES mechanism: questions and challenges 
PES was not initially conceptualized as an approach to alleviate poverty (Pagiola et al., 2005). Many 
authors insist that poverty alleviation should not be considered a primary goal in its implementation 
(Wunder, 2005). However, some authors argue that conservation and poverty alleviation are inseparable 
and the impacts of PES programs on livelihoods must be taken into consideration (Landell-Mills and 
Porras, 2002; FAO, 2007). Nevertheless, these impacts remains variable, non-generalized and depends 
on several factors (Pagiola et al. ,2005). Key questions remaining unanswered include: whether or not 
business transaction-based mechanisms such as programs that pay for forest conservation or water 
protection can, in fact, contribute to both environmental conservation and poverty alleviation in particularly 
poor regions? What major limitations are likely to emerge? A viable solution is to design PES mechanisms 
that more specifically take into account, from the very beginning, the needs of poor smallholders to 
improve their livelihoods and address the constraints preventing them from doing so. To date, research 
and practice on PES mechanisms has largely been led by economic, political and ecological approaches 
at regional and international scales to address theoretical issues of effectiveness, equity, and efficiency. 
PES is a relatively new mechanism, and knowledge about it is rooted as much in the theoretical as in the 
empirical. There have been few instances of research focusing on the socio-economical and agricultural 
drivers at the household and community levels that could help evolve theoretical PES schemes from 
market-led conservation tools to local development ones. A review of the literature shows that those 
research efforts undertook mainly exploratory forays with regards to a fictitious PES. Two types of 
questions are usually addressed: 
- Which groups of farmers are able or willing to participate in and benefit from a potential PES 
mechanism, in terms of costs and benefits (Kerr, 2002; Tschakert, 2004; 2007; Sommerville et al., 
2009)? 
- Which processes and features will enhance the long-term adherence of local people to a PES program 
(Georgiva et al., 2003; Pagiola et al., 2005; Petheram and Campbell, 2010)? 
Those studies did not really question the appropriateness of the tool with respect to local development 
issues. They tried to fit a social reality into a theoretical economic framework. PES is assumed to 
contribute to reducing poverty through the payments themselves, which are assumed to go mainly to 
poverty-stricken land users. In that case, income from PES might have a positive impact on local 
livelihoods if opportunity and transaction costs are carefully considered and if long-term contracts are 
signed – given the small amounts of payments per year. Besides, it is the characteristics of the concerned 
areas where PES programs are implemented that shape the relationship between PES and poverty 
alleviation: those studies mainly dealt with rewarding poor communities in rural areas with land rights 
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within state-owned and protected forests. In those cases, PES programs might enhance farmer livelihoods 
and also increase equity among communities and households. In other less “suitable” situations (very poor 
people who do not own or control land), Porras et al. (2008) found that “the cash payments appear to be 
relatively insignificant, and there is an opinion that they function more like supports or a bonus than a real 
incentive for land-use change.” Wunder (2008), Porras et al. (2008) and Bond and Mayers (2010) all cite 
non-income gains as significant PES benefits. These include strengthened property rights, capacity 
building, and improvements in social organization. Bond and Mayers (2010) caution, however, that “these 
effects are rarely specific to payments for watershed services and could potentially be generated through 
alternative actions.” 
We assume that a PES scheme is pro-poor if it delivers ES without compromising future livelihoods of the 
poor (Tschakert, 2004; McElwee, 2009). By adapting the concept of ES locally for poor people, i.e., by 
taking into account livelihood strategies, households ‘needs, local resource management norms and 
stakeholders expectations, we propose to go deeper into the principles that underlie a “pro-poor” PES. 
3. Background information on agriculture, conservation tools and hydropower project  in the 
study area 
3.1.  Previous history of the hydropower project 
The study site is located in the agricultural frontier of the rainforest in eastern Madagascar. In the province 
of Fianarantsoa, one of the poorest in Madagascar1, the Commune of Tolongoina is located in the 
lowlands on the eastern fringe of the forest corridor at an altitude of 500 meters, where live the Tanala 
ethnic people (Figure 1). The Tanala region is characterized by traditional land use based on shifting 
cultivation (rice and cassava) on sloping lands, known as tavy. Migration of Betsileo people from the 
western forest fringe to the Tanala region is ongoing today. The Tanala are not simply forest tribes 
practicing slash-and-burn agriculture. They also have experience in both lowland and upland rice 
cultivation. But as they have been repeatedly marginalized and removed to remote areas, they have never 
had the opportunity to establish permanent settlements. Land use is thus more a question of the physical 
environment and economic resources than a matter of culture and traditions (Serpantié et al., 2007). 
Establishing sustainable paddy fields is a long process that can take generations, especially in this 
mountainous region where there are no large plains. Political instability and conflicts further prevent 
farmers from increasing their social and economic capital. 
                                                          
1 In 2001, the poverty rate bordered on 80%, and 85% of the population lived in the countryside and was dependent 
on agriculture to make a living (INSTAT, 2001)   
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Figure 1 : Location of the Commune of Tolongoina in the forest corridor region 
Since the 1990s the region of the forest corridor has undergone numerous ICDPs, mainly led by USAID. 
Under the Gelose law (1996), community-based forest management (CBFM) contracts have been entered 
into in village territories. In view of the unsatisfactory impacts of CBFMs on the improvement of livelihoods 
(Toillier et al., 2011), USAID encouraged the exploration of economical valorization of the forest corridor in 
the early 2000s. Valorization of the water resource through a hydropower project has been quickly 
identified as a promising opportunity for both managing conservation and boosting development. In 2008, 
the RHYVIERE2 program, aimed at developing micro hydropower for rural electrification, chose the 
commune of Tolongoina as one of its seven pilot study sites. This program is being implemented by the 
French NGO GRET3 in partnership with ADER4 and Energy Assistance. In this framework, GRET decided 
to implement a PES mechanism, which appeared as a suitable tool for guaranteeing the financial, social 
and technical sustainability of the hydroelectric microplant. They asked researchers5 to develop an 
exploratory approach to design a pro-poor watershed-based PES scheme.  
3.2. What is at stake in terms of local development? Current agriculture changes and 
environmental issues 
In this region, and particularly in the Tolongoina commune, conservation policies have strenghtened 
agricultural transition processes (abandoning of slash-and-burn cultivation, intensification) and 
exacerbated disparities among rural communities.  
The so-called “ICDPs” did not manage to offer substantial alternatives to the restrictions of forests use, 
which related to the extraction of forest resources for commercial activities; protection of woody fallows; 
                                                          
2 Village Hydroelectric Network: Energy and Respect for the Environment, a 4-year program (2008–2012) funded by 
the European Union 
3 Group for Research and Technological Exchange 
4 Malagasy Rural Electrification Development Agency 
5 IRD-C3EDM SERENA program 
5 
 
banning of slash-and-burn practices and banning of forest clearing. In addition to the CBFM rules, from 
2008 onwards, USAID convinced the Commune to adopt a new law banning fire use within the watershed. 
According to it, there were obvious links between the rate of flow, water quality and slash-and-burn 
practices. This law put an end to bean cultivation and reduced cassava yields. In consequence, 
relationships between watershed inhabitants and local authorities became tense. Toillier and Lardon 
(2009) showed that the farmers’ capacities to adapt to the new rules were very heterogeneous, and 
conservation policies exacerbated disparities within the local population. While a few households 
managed to convert their traditional farming systems, based on shifting cultivation and rainfed hill rice, into 
a more diversified farming system combining rice fields, animal husbandry, cash crops and hill rice or 
cassava, others who found it more difficult to do so could rely on the traditional values that still underpin 
the extended family, in which sharing is obligatory and emergency help is assumed to be always available. 
Unfortunately, households located in the forest corridor and strongly impacted by the conservation 
measures because of the more restricted living conditions, were those of migrants from Betsileo country. 
In addition to increasing inequalities among households due to structural characteristics (household and 
farm characteristics, farmland structure), conservation policies exacerbated disparities and conflicts 
between the upland Betsileo migrants and the lowland autochthonous Tanala.  
Furthermore, the watershed of the hydropower project is located in the uplands of the Tolongoina 
commune (Figure 2), where Betsileo migrants are settled. Many drivers led farmers to intensify their 
farming systems or to transgress conservation rules. On the one hand, climatic conditions are 
unfavourable to the standard Tanala hill rice and cassava varieties (Serpantié et al., 2007). Low yields 
induce farmers to extend their farmland and to shorten crop-fallow rotations. On the other hand, the land 
available for agriculture is very limited due to constant demographic pressure, which also induces farmers 
to explore intensification options, for example, using plowing for ginger cultivation, which might increase 
erosion processes. The agricultural changes underway raised several questions on the sustainable 
management of water resources for the hydropower project. 
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Figure 2 : Location of the watershed of the hydropower and the hydroelectric network 
 
3.3. The expectations of the hydropower project’s promoters  from the PES tool 
In this context, the RHYVIERE program decided to explore the possibility for a PES mechanism to 
address three main challenges: 
- To ensure the provision of hydrological services for the technical functioning of the hydropower 
microplant, i.e., the maintenance of a stable streamflow during the dry season, reduced peak flows 
and a lower overall sediment yield (technical perenniality); 
- To take into account the pre-existing social inequalities and conflicts among local communities 
described above, in particular the fact that the potential service providers are migrants who will not 
have access to electricity (the electricity network spreads only down the hill) and are already 
confronting additional constraints on their agricultural practices; the PES scheme must not increase 
conflicts, should help to reduce disparities among households by strengthening their adaptation 
capacities in a context of strong environmental constraints and should also lead to an improvement in 
the livelihoods of households (social perenniality); 
- The cost of the PES mechanism should not threaten the profitability of the power plant, i.e., the cost 
allocated to the ES payments should not jeopardize the investments made by the private hydropower 
producer (financial perenniality).  
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4. A methodology based on the co-design of both environmental services and the 
governance scheme 
The aim of this research was to develop a field-rooted approach to build a PES scheme addressing the 
different challenges listed above. Our approach fell into two steps: 1) the co-definition of environmental 
services; 2) the co-design of a governance scheme. 
First, we assumed that both a shared representation of reality and an effective empowerment of local 
stakeholders form the basis for any collective action and also for a fair PES (Garcia and Lescuyer, 2008). 
We defined the co-design of environmental services as an iterative learning process between researchers 
and local stakeholders, based on the confrontation between hydrological theory and empiricism, local 
knowledge and observations of agricultural practices. This shared knowledge is supposed to facilitate a 
common understanding and definition of environmental services. It encompasses transdisciplinary studies 
in agronomy, hydrology and the social sciences. The hydrological behavior of the watershed has been 
modeled using low-cost data at the lowest water level, base flow and flood surveys (water and sediment 
load) within two sub-watersheds – one forested and one cultivated (Serpantié et al., ongoing). Research 
methods for accessing local knowledge included individual and group interviews and participant 
observations. In-depth interviews were conducted at the farm level in order to generate a representative 
typology of the diversity of livelihood strategies in the targeted watershed. Workshops were conducted 
regularly in order to report back and discuss research results with stakeholders, to facilitate the learning 
process and to provide insight into households’ perspectives within a PES mechanism. Field studies were 
conducted from 2009 until now. Second, the co-design of a governance scheme took the form of 
consultation with the main social organizations that appeared to be involved in the PES scheme for 
defining environmental services. The NGO remained a leading actor in this design process and helped 
maintain coherence between procedures for decentralizing electrification, pre-existing environmental 
contracts in the Commune and the legal framework. Our aim was to identify the main issues – and arrive 
at results – for driving the design of the PES scheme and for mobilizing the stakeholders at each step.  
5. Results  
We highlight the key elements of the co-design approach by focusing on results of (1) the different stages 
of collective learning, (2) the knowledge used to take decisions at each stage, and (3) the main 
controversial topics raised by stakeholders. Results are divided into three parts: the nature of the ES 
taking into consideration hydrological data, agricultural dynamics and farmer expectations; types of 
payment; and the scheme for governing the PES mechanism. 
5.1. Nature of the ES 
A long-term management issue regarding the hydrological model and agricultural dynamics 
Confrontation between our hydrological data and farmers’ knowledge invalidated the NGO’s beliefs on the 
links between deforestation and the drying up of springs, and between tavy and erosion. An undisturbed 
forest actually did not guarantee clean and regular water, conservation of dry season baseflows, or a great 
reduction in storm flows. The agriforested sub-watershed showed quite the same results in terms of 
hydrological services for hydroelectricity production. Agricultural practices only moderately impacted the 
rate of flow: an increase of 40% in water flow during moderate floods, no effect on sediment load, but an 
increase in landslides during cyclones. Lowest water levels were better in the agriforested sub-watershed 
than in the forested sub-watershed. Moreover, those moderate positive and negative effects of the 
agricultural area (which represents 1/6th of the total watershed area) altered only very slightly the water 
quality and quantity at the outlet in the short term. Nevertheless, our hydrological model did show that a 
deforested watershed would significantly alter hydrological services. According to the current agricultural 
dynamics, the real threats to water services would then instead appear in the long term. Watershed 
management for the provision of hydrological services would then consist of delaying the savannization 
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process and the concomitant erosion phenomena and of halting deforestation, i.e., in observing current 
rules (no fire and CBFM contract). 
Diversity of upstream farm households, understanding of ES and expectations 
To generate a representative sample of the diversity of livelihood strategies and household needs with 
respect to constraints planned for the ES, we applied a typology based on criteria related to (1) farm 
characteristics: household demographics, household assets, cropping system and labor allocation, (2) 
farmland structure and use, and (3) constraints perceived as arising from the ES. The typology is 
composed of four types of households (Table 1). 
ES was understood mainly through the provision of electricity. Households considered that they would do 
a favor to people downstream because even if they made an effort to adapt to rules they themselves 
would not get any electricity in return. They called it “fanasoavana,” literally, “mutual aid.”  
The majority of famers said that they would be willing to change their agricultural practices in order to 
protect water resources. But there were differences between households type. Types 2 and 3 explained 
that they had already attempted to adapt their farming systems to bans (slash-and-burn and forest 
protection) and that they would need support since they did not know how to grow bean or cassava 
without using fire. They also did not know what kind of new cultivation could be adapted to the local 
context. Type 2 households mainly asked for technical and financial support whereas type 3 households 
split into two groups: those who mainly asked for technical support, new profitable cultivation and the right 
to use fire; and the others who did not express any specific needs except to be able to keep their lands. 
Type 1 households could not specify what changes they could make and did not consider themselves 
service providers. They mainly asked for financial support. Type 4 households were not really bothered by 
conservation rules in the watershed and did not expect too much from a PES mechanism. 
Household 
type 
Livelihood strategies % of total 
upstream 
farms 
Type 1 Small-sized farms that were primarily concerned with acquiring enough 
income to satisfy daily necessities, especially through off-farm employment. 
24% 
Type 2 Large, scattered farms that combined cash crops (banana, sugar cane, 
coffee) and food crops (cocoyam, cassava, sweet potatoes, rice). However, 
cash crops are slow-moving goods because of the distance to markets and 
unavailable labor force; loss of expected income is offset by off-farm 
employment.  
39% 
Type 3 Mature, well-capitalized households, with rice fields and large banana fields 
that are farmed thanks to off-farm workers. The sale of banana and rice 
production covers household needs. Their farming systems are the most 
diversified, with breeding activities (cattle, poultry and sometimes pigs) and 
experimentation of new cash crops adapted to local conditions (ginger, 
pineapple). 
28% 
Type 4 Farms located downhill which own crop fields in the watershed. They mainly 
cultivate bananas, cassava and cocoyam in order to assert the ownership 
of lands. 
9% 
Table 1: Upstream household types and livelihood strategies 
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A consensus on the PES mechanism’s goals: to strike a balance between electricity beneficiaries 
and electricity non-beneficiaries 
According to field studies, the main goal for a pro-poor PES mechanism would be to restabilize a social 
context between winners and losers resulting from conservation and development measures (forest 
conservation and provision of electricity). Since upstream farmers had to adapt to a number of bans 
without any compensation, they considered themselves as losing out. In their view, the PES mechanism 
should offer both incentives for the future and compensation for the past for “good environmental 
management” of the watershed. Compensation is expected for past efforts in conserving forests and in 
changing their agricultural practices following CBFM contracts (2003) and fire-use bans (2008). The 
adoption of new agricultural practices that would stop savannization processes required new incentives 
through technical and financial support. 
5.2. Types and modes of payment  
Among households located in the watershed, a consensus emerged about the need to decide by 
themselves the allocation of PES funds: no direct payments to individuals but collective decisions to 
choose activities to be financed for each household type. They also asked for there to be no 
intermediaries involved in the payment mechanism; they wanted to be directly linked to the service 
beneficiaries. They agreed with the idea of perhaps financing technicians for training on or support for 
specific activities. 
Participatory workshops helped clarify the nature and mode of payments. It emerged that the main 
cultivations all households voluntarily wanted to improve and intensify were food crops (cassava and 
bean) and cash crops (bananas and coffee). Household types did not react in a similar uniform way to 
proposals for diversification of activities. Smallholders (type 1) and farms with small labor forces (type 2) 
preferred poultry breeding whereas large farms preferred new cash crops such as peanuts. These results 
were confirmed by the first technical support aimed at compensating farmers for past efforts. Their choices 
were consistent with previous analyses. The potential activities that could be funded by a PES scheme 
and their acceptability by household type are shown in Table 2. 
Activities Targeted household 
Technical training with field visits and experiments Types 2 and 3 
Support for the creation of collective organizations (co-operatives 
for storage, marketing; nurseries) and for connecting with markets  
All 
Support for individual farm management (management advice) All 
Easier access to credit, fertilizer, seeds and plants, equipment Types 2 and 3 
Easier access to other lands outside the watershed, especially for 
cultivating food crops Types 1 and 4 
Priority in off-farm employment offers Type 1 
More communication and information about technical changes, 
research results and the PES mechanism All 
Table 2: Activities that could be funded by PES and their acceptability by household type 
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5.3. Governance scheme 
Two site-specific governance issues emerged based on the definition of ES, PES’s goals and farmer 
expectations: 
- What is the role of the Commune given that it is both a service provider (as the guarantor of sound, 
long-term environmental management within its territory) and a service beneficiary (as an electricity 
user)? 
- How to link together the CBFM contract and the PES contract? ES provision consists of combating 
processes of savannization and deforestation. Since CBFM regulations aim at protecting forests 
through forest guards and sanctions, they overlap with ES provisions.  
These issues have been discussed between the Commune, the NGO and researchers. Governance 
choices have been made step by step, on the basis of various criteria. First, the NGO won acceptance for 
its approach of local development within the framework of the Rhyviere program. The program 
encouraged the empowerment of the Commune as a move towards decentralization and to strengthen 
local capacities. GRET proposed using the municipal tax applied to electricity bills in order to fund PES. 
The law planned a communal tax of 10% on the price of electricity to fund activities of public interest 
related to electricity distribution. This scenario offered two main advantages. First, the use of communal 
tax allows the PES mechanism to be backed by a legal framework. The Commune would become a 
legitimate intermediary between the private hydropower producer and service providers, by refunding a 
part of the tax to the association of watershed users. Second, the responsibility of long term environmental 
management would reside with the Commune and not with the private producer, who only has a medium-
term concession contract. ES costs would be covered by the difference between the funds available 
(depending on the number of electricity users) and the cost of activities to be undertaken in the watershed. 
The governance scheme is shown in Error! Reference source not found.. An association of 
representatives of watershed users, i.e., the presidents of COBA and farmer leaders, would receive cash 
payments and collectively decide on the allocation of funds according to the activities mentioned in the 
PES contract. The payments and activities undertaken would be monitored by the association of electricity 
users. Payments would be conditional on rules being followed. Violations of the main land-use bans (no 
fire, no deforestation) would be punished according to the rules of the valid CBFM contract and/or the 
rules of the Commune. 
11 
 
 
Figure 3: governance scheme 
 
6. Discussion on and insights into pro-poor PES design  
The outcomes of this study are discussed in terms of the overall objectives of this research, i.e., present 
lessons learnt from an action-research approach to accompany the design of a pro-poor PES mechanism 
and from participatory methods to explore the needs and expectations of poor people in the forest frontier.  
6.1. An action-research approach to accompany the design of the PES mechanism 
The cooperation between researchers and a development program led by an NGO was a suitable 
framework to explore whether a PES mechanism could be flexible enough to address local development 
issues. The keen interest of the local population in electricity supply and the driving role of the Commune 
in a decentralization process allowed a genuine mobilization of ES providers and beneficiaries in the co-
design process. We were then able to overcome the usual theories about the willingness to participate of 
local people or their acceptance of a theoretical PES scheme. Indeed, the PES scheme was really 
designed and tried out step by step. Our approach drew from action-research principles and concepts 
(Neef and Neubert, 2011), in that the primary researcher was involved with local people in exploring their 
situation. This encouraged reflection and learning, and led to a deeper analysis of their views and future 
options within a PES scheme. Our results indicate an important role for cognitive interventions alongside 
structural ones: participatory and low-cost hydrological data surveys; participatory research in farmers’ 
fields to examine erosion processes; collective agro-ecological diagnoses based on local knowledge; step-
by-step agricultural technical support; the creation of local associations; and co-design of management 
rules. Such integration has never been extensively undertaken and needs to be further conceptualized in 
order to make it reproducible.  
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6.2. To reconcile perceptions of the public and of science of the role of forests in water 
services 
The main result lies in the hybrid definition of ES. The combination of biophysical characteristics of 
targeted hydrological services, local knowledge and agricultural dynamics demonstrated to all 
stakeholders that it is a long-term management issue. Consequently, the PES mechanism will primarily 
act as a preventive tool to fight against the potential risk of savannization of the watershed. These results 
enabled the farmers’ environmental responsibilities to be reduced in the short term and also reduced the 
risks of social stigmatization in case of serious damage, e.g., due to a cyclone. Moreover, these results 
are consistent with local knowledge, but not with common ideas about “regulated forest services,” which 
refer to environmental orthodoxy (forests as water springs). The disparity between stakeholder 
perceptions must be addressed before financing mechanisms for forest conservation and before devising, 
developing and promoting agricultural changes. Indeed, if environmental measures are implemented 
independently of rooted knowledge, farmers simply will not cooperate or follow new rules. Many authors 
have shown that, generally, conservation tools for natural resource management are not sustainable 
unless there are clear interests for local populations (Bertrand et al., 2008; Cranford and Mourato, 2011).  
6.3. Providing a service or doing a favor? The true nature of pro-poor PES 
The farmers’ understanding of ES according to their culture, lifestyle and economic realities, confirmed the 
fact that direct payments to individuals are not a desirable feature of poverty alleviation tools or 
environmental management ones (e.g., Farley and Costanza, 2010; Sommerville et al., 2009; Cranford 
and Mourato, 2011). Most of the farmers understood ES as doing a favor to the people downstream. Even 
though sharing and mutual aid remain fundamental values to these societies, farmers wanted incentives 
for future changes and compensations for past efforts in order to support and reinforce their strategies of 
adapting to conservation. But above all, farmers wanted a management tool to help realize their own 
development objectives. Targeting households with measures and activities that take into account their 
specific land-use dynamics, socioeconomic needs and adaptation capacities emerged as a suitable 
solution. These results strengthen the idea that watershed-based PES without hydrological and social 
foundations cannot address environmental issues in a sustainable way, nor help improve livelihoods. They 
also confirm Polanyi’s (1957) assertion that aspects of nature are ‘‘resistant’’ to commodification due to 
their unique physical and social properties. A pro-poor PES specifically requires a systemic approach for 
successful implementation and its promoters cannot avoid a deep-rooted approach that will lead to a 
conveniently tailored mechanism, adapted to local norms, issues and expectations.  
6.4.  An “asset-building” PES as a tool to promote advisable changes for agriculture in the 
forest frontier 
The project to co-design the Tolongoina PES scheme suggests a series of potential responses to key 
questions about suitable policy tools to accompany agricultural transitions in the forest frontier.  
Given the agro-ecological conditions of the eastern rainforest in Madagascar and the growing 
demographic pressure, practitioners of agronomic research and providers of technical services have no 
sustainable farming system to propose yet. The farmers’ knowledge also showed its limitations. This 
transition stage requires experimentation, both in the technical and the organizational fields. Technical 
experiments will help develop agro-ecological farming systems adapted to local economic and ecologic 
constraints. Organizational experiments are related to the search for new institutional arrangements based 
on new relationships that emerge between stakeholders in a resource-conservation context. In both 
cases, long-term approaches are necessary, but various activities must be considered: short-term 
activities in order to respond to the farmers’ urgent needs (to eat, to clothe themselves, to access health 
services, to send children to school, etc.) and long-term investments that are aimed at transforming 
farming systems in a sustainable way. To sum up, gradual, systemic, local and scientific knowledge-
13 
 
rooted and long-term approaches are needed to address challenges of the agricultural forest frontier. We 
showed that an “asset-building” PES6 mechanism embedded in a participatory and systemic approach 
framework is flexible enough to address those challenges. PES rhetoric allowed the mobilization of local 
people concerned about an unfair socio-economical situation with losers and winners. Then co-designing 
the ES allowed the PES to be tailored more effectively to the needs of the poor smallholders. Further 
studies will be needed to explore the long-term effects of PES on environment and the welfare of farm 
households.  
In conclusion, we call for further research to explicitly include from the beginning agricultural issues and 
local stakeholders in PES mechanism design. 
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